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Abstract In an anthology on panentheism, Keith Ward assesses the appropriateness of
the metaphor of embodiment for God, as well as the viability of the concept of
panentheism itself, as he considers the theologies of Ramanuja, Hegel, and process
thought. Ward frames polar problems with respect to the analogy of self-body/God-
world and to the concept of panentheism. (1) Ramanuja and Hegel’s theologies
ultimately deny the freedom and compromise the independence and otherness of the
creatures. (2) Process theology compromises divine sovereignty and perfection, making
God too passible to the world’s evils. This article attempts to transcend such one-sided
approaches as it develops a balanced concept of panentheism and a metaphor of divine
embodiment that provide for mutual influence between God and the world, wherein
both the suffering and happiness of the world affect God, while maintaining sole divine
causal ultimacy with respect to the world.
Keywords Panentheism . Embodiment . Pantheism . Indeterminism . Transcendence .
Immanence . Ultimacy. Process theology . Ramanuja . Hegel .Whitehead . Charles
Hartshorne . KeithWard . Niels Henrik Gregersen . Paul Tillich
In this article, I will analyze and critique several versions or purported versions of
panentheism. In so doing, I will reference contributions from In Whom We Live and
Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific World,
especially that by Keith Ward, and several other contemporary sources, as well as
German idealist, process, and Hindu thinkers. I will conclude that a viable embodied,
panentheistic model of the nature of God is feasible, one that draws from the strengths
and avoids the weaknesses of other models. Ward titles his contribution to the just-
mentioned anthology, ‘The World as the Body of God: A Panentheistic Metaphor.’ In
this chapter, Ward assesses the appropriateness of that metaphor of embodiment for
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God, as well as the viability of the concept of panentheism itself, as he bounces off the
theologies of Ramanuja, Hegel, and process thought, all of which he considers to be
versions of panentheism. Ward frames polar problems with respect to the analogy of
self-body/God-world: (1) for Ramanuja and Hegel, the self totally constitutes the body
or world as an expression of itself, thus ultimately denying the freedom and
compromising the independence and otherness of the creatures, and (2) for process
theology, the body totally constitutes the self (which is, the divine consequent nature),
thus compromising divine sovereignty and perfection, making God too passible to the
world’s evils.1
Divine Transcendence and Immanence
Ward’s polarities relate to panentheism’s attempts to configure rightly divine transcen-
dence and immanence and their interrelationships. Of course, the raison d’être of
panentheism was to re-balance transcendence and immanence in light of modern
scientific knowledge. Rejecting what its originators considered the neglect of divine
immanence in classical theism and deism, it attempted to affirm a strong divine interest
and presence in the world but without supernatural intervention that controverted
natural laws. Transcendence and immanence in relation to God do not represent simple
opposites; they may overlap depending on what angle or issue is at stake. For our
purposes, several distinctions will prove helpful.
Divine transcendence or beyondness of the world involves both what we can call
qualitative and quantitative aspects—which in turn may involve some overlapping: (1)
God’s attributes surpass those of any creature, and (2) God’s reality or being is distinct
from that of the world. The greater significance and scope of divine power compared
with any worldly power represents one aspect of qualitative transcendence. For Ward,
the panentheistic models of Ramanuja and Hegel emphasize absolutely the causality of
the divine self, so that the causal power of the (body of the) world becomes nothing in
relation to God. AsWard recognizes, this compromises the freedom of the creatures.2 Notice
that such divine determinism could compromise the quantitative aspect of transcendence; if
God completely causes the world and all its creatures, are they perhaps modes
or attributes of God, even if lesser modes or attributes? Therefore, one could
view transcendence in the sense of absolute causal power as entailing excessive
immanence in the world. While God’s reality may involve much that transcends
this world, divine determinism would seem to entail an unremitting one-to-one
correspondence of the world to one aspect of God.
This brings us to a final aspect of divine transcendence of the world, namely, that
God may enjoy values, goodness, and bliss apart from and in addition to whatever
values, goodness, and happiness that God derives from this world (and any other world
of creatures). Ramanuja and Hegel’s conceptions of God (at least as construed by
1 Keith Ward, ‘TheWorld as the Body of God: A Panentheistic Metaphor,’ in In WhomWe Live and Move and
Have Our Being, ed. Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans), pp. 62–
72. Ward notes that Hegel does not regard the universe as the body of God, precisely because finite selves do
not wholly control their bodies (p. 65).
2 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ pp. 66–67.
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Ward) involve the realization by God of infinite value apart from the world, which for
Ward represents a strength of their models.3
If divine transcendence emphasizes the distinctness of God from the world quanti-
tatively, divine immanence can cause some blurring of that distinctness. Indeed, some
blurring quantitatively would seem to come into play with Western monotheism,
whether acknowledged or not. For divine omniscience entails an immediacy, a certain
lack of separation or externality. The finite subject-object structure of creaturely
knowing always involves some ignorance and externality. Theology has found such
deficiency unacceptable for divine knowing. As Augustine put it, ‘God is closer to us
than we are to ourselves.’
If divine transcendence is sometimes associated with God as a cause that affects but
remains unaffected, divine immanence may be associated with God as effect or as
being affected by the world and its individuals. As suggested above, Ward charges that
for process theology, God’s self as concrete, as the divine consequent nature, is wholly
determined or constituted by the world or body of God.
Two Western Panentheistic Traditions—Plus an Eastern One
Before assessing Ward’s critique of the two forms of embodied divinity and attendant
panentheisms, I will note the similarity of his polarities to panentheistic polarities
posited by others. In a chapter in the same volume as Ward’s piece, Niels Henrik
Gregersen writes that different versions of panentheism share ‘both active and respon-
sive aspects of divinity vis-à-vis the world.’4 Gregersen goes on to expound upon an
‘expressivist panentheism,’ with none other than Hegel as primary exemplar,5 and a
‘dipolar or Whiteheadian panentheism.’6 The former emphasizes God’s active self-
expression, while the latter emphasizes ‘passive absorption of experiences into God’
rather than ‘active transformation of creatures.’7 For my part, I identify an active and
passive aspect of panentheism; the former focusing on divine power or God as cause
and the latter on divine knowledge and sympathetic receptivity.8 Similarly, Mariusz
Tabaczek describes two forms of panentheism available for contemporary theology,
one Hegelian, the other Whiteheadian. 9 Not coincidentally, I take the German-
American theologian Paul Tillich as my primary exemplar of a panentheism empha-
sizing the active aspect of divinity and Charles Hartshorne, the principal theological
interpreter of Whitehead, as primary exemplar emphasizing the passive aspect. Thus,
we can readily identify a German idealist and Romantic idealist tradition of
panentheism, on the one hand, and a process tradition on the other. Notice that, while
other thinkers construe the two traditions as emphasizing one aspect to the relative
3 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ pp. 63–64.
4 Niels Henrik Gregersen, ‘Three Varieties of Panentheism,’ in In Whom We Live, p. 22.
5 Gregersen, ‘Three Varieties,’ pp. 27–31.
6 Gregersen, ‘Three Varieties,’ pp. 31–34.
7 Gregersen, ‘Three Varieties,’ p. 33.
8 David H. Nikkel, Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich: A Creative Synthesis (New York: Peter Lang,
1995); BPanentheism,^ Entry in The Encyclopedia of Science and Religion (New York: Macmillan Reference
USA, 2003).]
9 Mariusz Tabaczek, ‘Hegel and Whitehead: In Search for Sources of Contemporary Versions of Panentheism
in the Science-Theology Dialogue,’ Theology and Science 11/2 (2013), pp. 143–161.
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neglect of the others, Ward writes as if active causality and passive receptivity,
respectively, stand as mutually exclusive in Hegelian versus process traditions. In so
framing the models, Ward proves helpful, whether intentionally or not, in uncovering
the difficulties when either aspect is taken to an extreme.
Ward adds an Eastern twist to these two Western models. There is a sense in which the
Hindu worldview devalues bodies and embodiment; ignorance causes us to wrongly find
our identity in a self embodied in the material universe rather than in connection to the
supreme self. Thus, God’s body, the world, stems from the ignorance of the creatures and,
from the divine perspective, constitutes God’s play. As Ward insightfully declares, ‘Bodies
exist to enable the karma of spirits to be worked out. The body is the instrument of the self,
more like clothing than like skin.’10Ward correctly emphasizes that thematerial universe is a
self-expression ofGod and under God’s control for Ramanuja, as is the casewithHegel.11At
the same time, he recognizes that Ramanuja (like Hegel) tries to uphold human freedom and
responsibility. Ward suggests that Ramanuja reconciles divine determinism and human
freedom through compatibilism, as does Hegel as well as Calvin. 12 However, while
Ramanuja stipulates that God must grant permission for the finite soul to act, he indicates
that this ‘action primarily depends upon the volitional effort of the soul,’ suggesting
indeterminism as to whether the soul decides to move closer to or further from God.13
Consequently, many interpreters view Ramanuja as an indeterminist. While God controls
the structures of the universe, including the structures governing karma and reincarnation,
God allows the human atman or self to choose its direction.14
On the other hand, Ward’s second exemplar of the world as a divine self-expression,
Hegel, is uncontroversially a determinist. Ward expresses surprise that Hegel is some-
times considered a pantheist rather than a panentheist.15 I would contend that this is not
at all surprising, precisely because of Hegel’s determinism. Indeed, I join those who
classify Hegel as pantheistic.
Before arguing that position, a brief excursion into the genealogy of the terms
pantheism and panentheism in the context of nineteenth-century German idealism
and Romantic idealism will prove helpful. This idealism spawned various versions of
both, with no universally accepted distinction between the two terms. Apparently
unaware of K. C. F. Krause’s coining of the term panentheism, Schelling referred to
his philosophy of religion as ‘true pantheism,’16 even with his later emphasis on divine
and human indeterminate freedom. Gustav Theodor Fechner, having the advantage of
Krause’s term, offered probably the clearest and most fully developed panentheistic
10 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ pp. 65.
11 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ pp. 63–64.
12 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ pp. 66–67.
13 Ramanuja, in Sacred Books of the East, trans. George Thibaut, ed. F. Max Muller (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1904), p. 557; in Philosophers Speak of God, Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 184–185.
14 For example, a Western interpreter, Philip Clayton, ‘Panentheisms East and West,’ Sophia 49/2 (2010), pp.
188–190; and an Eastern interpreter, Abha Singh, ‘Social Philosophy of Ramanuja: Its Modern Relevance,’
Indian Philosophical Quarterly 28/4 (October 2001), pp. 495–496).
15 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ p. 65.
16 John W. Cooper, Panentheism: The Other God of the Philosophers (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic,
2006), p. 95.
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model, which included mutual indeterminate freedom.17 Ward’s surprise at the consid-
eration of Hegel as a pantheist may stem from missing how central the notion of
freedom was to Romantic idealism and its advocates who adopted the term
panentheism. In embracing more organic and affective understandings of the relation-
ship between God and world, it reacted against enlightenment mechanism and logical
necessity. Interestingly, Charles Hartshorne first labeled his process theology as ‘The
New Pantheism,’ until he learned of Krause’s term.18
Emphasizing Divine Transcendence and Active Causality—Hegel
and Hinduism
In this section, I will focus on panentheism as emphasizing active divine self-
expression to the neglect of divine passivity or receptivity through consideration of
Hegel’s and Hindu theology. One could say that panentheism attempts to get as close to
pantheism as possible in stressing the intimate relationship between God and the world,
while still maintaining clear distinctions between them. In my judgment, mutual
indeterminate freedom constitutes a crucial distinction. Indeed, I agree with
Hartshorne on the need to uphold some mutual indeterminism in defining panentheism.
19 Of course, the historically dominant form of Western classical theism, like Hegel and
arguably Ramanuja, accepts divine determinism. However, it upholds the externality of
the created world to God. When one holds with Hegel that the world is part of God and
the divine life, it appears that little ground remains on which to deny that creatures are
in some sense a mode of the divine.
Ward makes two suggestions against considering Hegel a pantheist. First, Ward
notes that the world could not serve as the body of God for Hegel, as selves ‘do not, in
general, wholly control bodies.’ He adds that a lack of complete control would subject
an embodied (and in this context pantheistic) God to time and suffering.20 In a different
context, Gregersen affirms Ward’s recognition that for Hegel divine transcendence
entails that evil as evil does not exist in God.21 Here Ward appears to assume the
following two factors favor the label of ‘panentheism’ rather than ‘pantheism’: (1) the
universe having ‘no independent causal role in the constitution of the divine being’ as
God exercises complete control while the creatures exercise none in relation to God,
and (2) pantheism entails that God is affected by the temporality and negativity of the
world. However, pantheism often involves such complete divine control, as in the
famous example of Spinoza. Moreover, finite suffering has no effect on the beatitude of
Spinoza’s pantheistic God. Advaita (‘non-dual’) Hinduism, typically classified as an
acosmic form of pantheism, would express a similar view; evil in no way constitutes or
conditions the infinite, undifferentiated divine, nirguna Brahman, and its bliss. And as
17 Gustav Theodor Fechner, Zend-Avesta: Oder ueber die Dinge des Himmels und des Jenseits, Vom
Standpunkt der Naturbeschreibung, 5th ed., (Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1922).
18 Charles Hartshorne, ‘The New Pantheism I and II,’ Christian Register 115 (February 1936).
19 E.g., Hartshorne, Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Vergilius Ferm (New York: Philosophical Library, 1945),
s.v. ‘panentheism,’ s.v. ‘transcendence.’
20 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ p. 65.
21 Gregersen, ‘Three Varieties,’ p. 30.
Affirming God as Panentheistic and Embodied 295
mentioned above, panentheists typically insist on some indeterminate creaturely
freedom.
Second, Ward invokes divine transcendence of worldly self-expression, claiming
that for Hegel, the ‘whole temporal process’ of the world constitutes ‘only a small part’
of God’s being.22 In itself, such transcendence would not appear to save a theology
from pantheism. Consider advaita Hinduism, the acosmic pantheism mentioned just
above, which insists on the absolute identity of Brahman/Atman with finite atmans or
selves/souls. Though divine Brahman expresses itself in many worlds and all finite
selves, these self-expressions add nothing to the divine bliss or fulfillment. While for
Hegel, the cosmos is ‘in some sense a part of what God essentially is’23 (which is
definitely not the case with advaita theology), Ward still sees the world as playing little
role in divine fulfillment since ‘the Spirit is complete in itself, eternally self-conscious
and perfect.’ 24 In further describing the seemingly paradoxical nature of Hegelian
dialectic, Ward maintains that ‘God is incomplete without some world, which is . . . part
of the divine perfection.’25 Concerning Hegel’s notion of God’s eternal completeness
and referencing his Encyclopedia, Gregersen makes the following points: an ‘eternal
content’ abides in God as Father—though the nature or ‘content’ of this content is not
specified. Differentiation of this ‘eternal being’ occurs in the Son. It seems, though, that
the self-consciousness essential for divinity arises only with the differentiation within
God of the Son, not in the Father and its eternal content alone. ‘God is God only to the
extent that God knows Godself; God’s self-knowing is, further, a self-consciousness in
humanity and humanity’s knowledge of God, which proceeds to humanity’s self-
knowing in God’ [emphases original]; the latter part of the process being the work of
the Spirit. 26 While Gregersen highlights the temporal nature of this process, Ward
focuses on the ‘block view’ of time in Hegel.27 This whole process of differentiation
and reunion is eternally complete within God, with respect to the immanent Trinity; the
process involves incompleteness only in the world and the economic Trinity. Yet, this
process of the completion of divinity can be interpreted as involving less transcendence
of and more dependence on the world than Ward and perhaps Gregersen allow. As
Joseph Prabhu puts it, ‘To become a concrete and truly spiritual God, the immanent
trinity must be re-enacted in the economic trinity in the form of worldly incursion. The
internal self-differentiation of God must be expressed in actuality, if the differentiation
is to be taken seriously.’ Prabhu does note that this ‘dependence’ stems from God’s
necessary activity28 (which takes us back to the pantheistic implications of Hegel’s
determinism). So even if Ward’s view of Hegelian divine transcendence of worldly self-
expression is correct, that the world plays only a small part in divine fulfillment, the
finite selves constitute necessary parts of the being of God. Therefore, none of the
22 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ p. 65.
23 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ p. 65.
24 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ p. 64.
25 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ p. 65.
26 Gregersen, ‘Three Varieties,’ p. 30; G. F. W. Hegel, Enzyklopadie der philosophishen Wissenschagten
(1830), no. 564, translation from Peter C. Hodgson, ed.Hegel: Theologian of the Spirit (Minneapolis: Fortress
Press, 1997), p. 144.
27 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ p. 64.
28 Joseph Prabhu, ‘Hegel’s Secular Theology,’ Sophia 49/2 (2010), p. 226.
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possible arguments based on divine transcendence in Hegel appear to succeed in
clearing him of the ‘charge’ of pantheism.
What can we say about the disadvantages of a panentheism (or pantheism) where
divine transcendence, causality, and control are overemphasized? As already suggested,
Ward and I agree on the need for creaturely freedom in a viable concept of God. And on
that score, mere compatibilism will not do; Ward insists that genuine human freedom
must involve some indeterminism.29 Therefore, we agree on the unacceptability of any
concept of panentheism or metaphor of divine embodiment where God determines and
controls everything in the world. Determinism also undermines the distinctness of the
creatures as ‘in’ God but not identical with the divine—thus crossing the line into
pantheism in my view. The overemphasis on divine transcendence also undermines that
the world affects God in the sense of contributing to divine fulfillment. Even in
Ramanuja’s vishishtavaita (‘qualified non-dualism’) Hindu theology, and even if one
interprets it as indeterministic, the world makes no contribution to divine fulfillment;
for as Ward correctly notes, ‘divine perfection is essentially changeless’ for Ramanuja.
30 With respect to Hegel, the world’s evil in no way conditions God. Moreover,
whatever positive contribution creation makes to divine fulfillment results completely
from God’s causal activity; the creatures make no contribution in their own right. Thus,
a panentheism that emphasizes divine transcendence, causality, and control to the
exclusion of any genuine divine passivity is found wanting.
At this point, I will suggest a panentheism drawing on a strength of Hindu theology
and Western idealism that emphasize divine causal activity, while avoiding their
potential problems; God serves as the ultimate beneficent cause of the world—where
God expresses Godself through the world metaphorized as the body of God, but where
God does not deterministically make all the choices of the creatures, where the world is
not a total or perfect self-expression due to indeterminate freedom, and where crea-
turely choices genuinely affect and make a difference for God as immanent. For this
model, a world where God enables indeterminate freedom is closer to perfection than
one without it. Enabling spontaneity and freedom in creation and mutual influence of
God and world more truly express the nature of the divine self than does divine
determinism or impassibility.
Emphasizing Divine Immanence and Passivity—the Process Tradition
I turn now to Ward’s other pole, wherein process panentheism allegedly entails that the
body of the world totally constitutes the concrete divine self, thus compromising divine
transcendence in terms of sovereignty and perfection. Here, I believe Ward overstates
the case. The primordial nature determines the possibilities for the universe. Due to its
‘relatively abstract’ nature as mere potential,31 I grant Ward that it does not play any
direct role in constituting the actual divine self. However, Ward fails to recognize that,
according to process panentheism, the divine activity of providing the initial aim—
God’s preference for decision/action—to each creaturely ‘unit occasion’ exercises a
29 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ p. 67.
30 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ p. 66.
31 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ p. 68.
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huge influence on the world and the divine consequent nature, that is, on the actual or
concrete divine self. Rather, he quickly dismisses such ‘superjective aspects’ of God ‘as
influential but not primarily causative.’32 Yet, at least on process theology’s own terms,
this influence is quite significant. Indeed, without it, all that would exist would be
chaotic, low-grade unit occasions rather than our universe. One interpreter, Robert
Cummings Neville, has in effect compared the power of the divine initial aim with that
of divine efficient causal determinism, labeling the process God ‘a smother-mother.’33
While I think Neville overstates the case for the possible influence of ‘persuasion’ and
while I regard the lack of any empirical evidence for the existence of initial aims from
God as a huge problem, still Ward is not entirely fair to Whiteheadian/Hartshornean
theology.
Nevertheless, I quite agree with Ward that process thought unduly undermines
divine sovereign power or the active aspect of God in panentheism. I accept the
theological significance of creation ex nihilo, that the universe and its constituents
have no ultimate ontological independence from God, rather than the process view that
unit occasions in their bare existence possess an ultimate independence of being. In
addition to the Christian tradition, one can offer a philosophical argument for creation
from nothing. A satisfactory explanation of the universe, or of why anything exists,
must address the relationship of possibility to actuality. That is, of all possibilities, why
have only certain possibilities as to the nature of our universe achieved actualization? I
submit that the most satisfactory explanation of the universe should postulate a
reservoir or source of all possibility. Whitehead felt this need and posited the primordial
nature of God as the principle of limitation. In a non-temporal decision, God deter-
mined which possibilities out of all potentiality would be available to our universe.34
However, possibility here is only abstract rather than the source of concrete actuality.
For concrete realities—unit occasions of experience—come into bare existence through
the principle of creativity, rather than through divine power, and then receive more
particular possibilities from which to choose. This implies that both this ultimate
principle of creativity and God serve as an ultimate source of possibility for unit
occasions which become actual. Thus, we have one source for inchoate realities and
another that allows for their definition. Positing one ultimate source of all possibilities
rather than two is cleaner, as it eliminates concern with how and whether these two
ultimate sources might relate to each other.
Granting creation ex nihilo, God’s sustaining power upholds the creation and its
creatures in each moment; without it, the universe would vanish. For me, this entails
that, in immediately upholding the universe, God immediately empowers creaturely
possession and use of some indeterminate spontaneity and freedom. While I see the
need for a panentheistic model to declare explicitly such empowerment, I find neces-
sary such an entailment for any Christian or other theology that affirms both creation
from nothing and indeterminate freedom. Of course, Whitehead insisted on the ultimate
ontological independence of the world precisely because he worried that ultimate
ontological dependence upon God would preclude any creaturely freedom.
32 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ p. 68.
33 Robert C. Neville, Creativity and God, new ed. (Albany: State University of New York, Press, 1995), p. 9.
34 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1925), pp. 178–79:
Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: Macmillan, 1929)—Corrected ed. Edited by David
Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: Macmillan, 1978), p. 522.
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I see no reason, though, why the upholding of creatures in their freedom is
impossible or implausible. Indeed, if God is the ultimate ground of all potentiality
and actuality, what reality inside or outside of the divine could prevent God from
empowering creaturely indeterminate freedom?
I also endorse a stronger notion of divine power in terms of providence than does
process theology, in holding that God directly determines the fundamental conditions,
structures, and laws of the universe (analogous to efficient causation in the universe
rather than final causation). Thus, I conclude that one can overcome weaknesses of the
process model with a stronger version of divine transcendence, causality, and control
than it has, while still maintaining the indeterminate creaturely freedom crucial to that
model.
Given my endorsement of a strong active aspect of God in my model of
panentheism, I need to address the following issue: Ward questions calling ‘the finite
persons Bparts of God,^’ particularly if one accepts God’s ultimate ontological priority,
for this terminology ‘would seem to deny their otherness.’35 I have affirmed in this
article some otherness and distinctness of the creatures in relation to God for
any panentheism that steers clear of pantheism. Ward’s concern here seems to
reflect a narrow reading of mereology, of the possible relationships between
parts and wholes, assuming the undifferentiated, quasi-materialistic, or
substantialistic nature of the divine whole. In particular, wholes may be greater
than the sum of their parts, and attributes of the parts may not apply to the
whole. While the universe is part of God, God and the universe do not form an
undifferentiated whole. Panentheism draws definite distinctions between God as
the including whole and the non-divine parts of the universe considered in
themselves. Certain properties of divinity apply to God but definitely not to the
individual creatures or to the universe itself. As previously stated, another
important distinction concerns mutual freedom.
While criticizing the process view of divine causality, I fully subscribe to process
theology’s most significant contribution in my estimation, which relates to the aspect of
passivity or receptivity: perfect divine knowledge and perfect sympathy or compassion
for all that occurs in the universe. 36 Given both indeterminate freedom and the
inevitability of natural evil in a finite world, suffering inevitably occurs and does affect
the degree of the divine happiness. I find it perplexing that Ward demurs from the
process contention that ‘the greatest possible knowledge must include the actual
experiences of all finite beings.’37 My own intuitive sense of God’s omniscience has
always acknowledged that God knows immediately whatever I think or feel, from ‘the
inside’ rather than externally. I also believe that classical theism’s understanding of
omniscience entails direct knowledge (albeit in tension with its insistence on impassi-
bility). Process theology has never held that God’s evaluation of a murderer’s
35 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ p. 69.
36 Fechner already articulated a strong sense of divine sympathy: ‘Is not the best God for us who bears within
himself our good fortune and misfortune? . . . What would he be if he looked upon our misery merely from the
outside, as we look upon the misery of a beggar in rags to whom we throw a penny? . . . God does not view
your pain merely from the outside, but he feels it along with yourself . . . .’ Zend Avesta, p. 249, as quoted with
ellipses in Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, Philosophers Speak of God (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1953), p. vi.
37 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ p. 70.
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motivation known completely by God, to use Ward’s example, simply accepts the
murderer’s evaluation. The rule of thumb here, as for panentheism in general, is that
God includes and transcends.
A Balanced Panentheism and the Problem of Evil
I believe I have established the possibility of, even the plausibility of, a balanced
construal of panentheism, and potentially of the self-body analogy for God, which
avoids the polar pitfalls set out by Ward. In the conclusion of his article, Tabaczek
wonders why Christian panentheistic theologians have heavily drawn upon Whitehead
while ignoring Hegel. 38 I would answer that the overriding factor is that these
theologians favor some indeterminate freedom over determinism. But Tabaczek rightly
senses that panentheistic theology can take significant insights from the German idealist
tradition. Instead of one-sided approaches, where God either totally determines the
world or where the world overdetermines God, there is mutual influence appropriate to
God’s status as God and our status as creatures. Instead of either the self wholly
constituting the body or the body constituting the self, mutual influence pertains.
Thus, I have attempted to overcome a deterministic pantheism or any panentheism
that compromises creaturely indeterminate freedom or some creaturely ability to affect
the divine life, as well as to overcome deficiencies in process theology’s concept of
divine causality, in drawing a panentheism that hopefully does justice to both the active
(or self-expressive) and passive (or receptive) aspects of the divine and, thus, represents
a full-fledged panentheism.
Some, however, reject panentheism because they cannot countenance the notion that
any evil exists ‘in God.’ I will now address that important issue. Ward and Gregersen
are among those who do not accept any panentheistic model for the relationship
between our present world and God. Only when creaturely lives find their consumma-
tion in God and God has overcome all evil can the world be said to truly reside ‘in’
God.39 Ward concurs with Polkinghorne’s approval of ‘eschatological panentheism’40
(a phrase first used by Tillich), while Gregersen labels such a model ‘soteriological
panentheism.’41
In defending that the evil along with the good of this universe is in God, I would first
point out that ‘in’ is a spatial metaphor for the relationship of God and world, open to
various interpretations. Next, I appeal to the previously mentioned fact that an attribute
of a part often does not apply to the whole. Soreness in my big toe does not make me
less of a moral person nor does it necessarily mean that overall I do not feel happy.
Similarly, that evil is an intimate part of the divine life in no way denies God’s moral
perfection or the overall divine beatitude. With process theology, I judge that overall
good outweighs evil in this universe and, thus, divine sympathetic inclusion of the
world adds to the divine happiness in each moment. Contra process theology, I
additionally maintain that God may obtain extraterrestrial, non-temporal values apart
38 Tabaczek, ‘Whitehead and Hegel,’ p. 158.
39 Relative to Christian theology and relatively speaking, Ward and Gregersen put more emphasis on a
doctrine of salvation, while I place more emphasis on a doctrine of creation.
40 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ pp. 71–72.
41 Gregersen, ‘Three Varieties,’ pp. 24–27.
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from social relationships, including the value of the divine sense of its own existence as
well as aesthetic and other values. Additionally, God may derive happiness from other
universes besides our own.
For me, the most telling argument in favor of the ‘in-ness’ of the world to God
concerns divine ultimacy with respect to the world. If the world stands in ultimate
ontological dependence upon God, I see no room for the externality of the world to
God. Interestingly, Christopher C. Knight notes that, when Eastern patristic theologians
spoke of creation from nothing, they referred not to an absolute nothingness but to the
‘uncreated possibilities’ that lay within God as ground and abysmal depth.42 If God
created using realities with some inherent ontological independence from God, it would
make sense to maintain the externality of the world to God. However, if the divine
serves as the reservoir of all possibility and creates from possibilities within God, what
sense does it make to declare that the creatures are simply or strictly external to God?
Granting that God does not desire evil and granting the reality of creaturely indeter-
minate freedom, identity does not govern the internal relations of the divine life. As
asserted above, differentiation exists within the divine life as including whole. But no
place exists for externality and separation like that of finite individuals to one another.
God transcends the distinction between subject and object. As Tillich enjoined, God is
not a being alongside other beings but in some sense being-itself.
Finally, the ultimacy and associated non-externality of God with respect to the world
contain an important moral dimension. For me, the God who does not suffer with the
suffering of the world is less ultimate and divine than the God who does. If the
negativity of the world is real for God, then I maintain that it must retain a lasting
impact on the divine life. Yes, the negativity may contribute to a greater good and may
be in some real sense mostly overcome. But nothing can controvert the reality that
creatures suffered in the temporal world. It makes no sense to me to hold that this real
negativity has no real impact on the divine life, that this negative element has no
negative effect on the degree of divine blessedness.
Panentheism and the Embodiment of God
As the ‘conflict and suffering and evil in the world’ preclude for Ward any panentheism
with respect to the world as it is, so too do they lead him to conclude that ‘it does not
look as if the world is the body of God.’43 While I have just addressed the issue of evil,
Ward’s discussion raises wider issues concerning the appropriateness of the metaphor
of the world as the body of God. Metaphors and analogies always involve an element
of unlikeness as well as likeness, of negation as well as affirmation. It is incumbent on
us to acknowledge the unlikeness involved in any metaphor pertaining to God. Ward’s
treatment of process theology, focusing on Whitehead, does not mention Hartshorne’s
development of the ‘mind-body’ analogy for God and world, including Hartshorne’s
stipulations to preserve divine perfection or unsurpassibility. These include the follow-
ing: (1) God does not have an external environment outside of the body with which to
contend, (2) divine embodiment in no way threatens God’s existence, which is
42 Christopher C. Knight, ‘Theistic Naturalism and the Word Made Flesh,’ in In Whom We Live, pp. 59–60.
43 Ward, ‘World as Body of God,’ p. 71.
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necessary, and (3) unlike our limited knowledge of our own cells, God omnisciently
encompasses the world’s actuality.44 While accepting a general panentheism, in the
same volume as the Ward and Gregersen pieces, the late Arthur Peacocke objects to the
world as the body of God in any literal or apparently any metaphorical sense, due to
‘the distortions of any model of the world as God’s body.’45 That God would need to
know all about this ‘body’ is one of the reasons behind Peacocke’s objection. 46
Nevertheless, at the same time, Peacocke welcomes another panentheistic metaphor,
‘the panentheistic feminine image of the world, as being given existence by God in the
very Bwomb of God.^’47 Given my acceptance of the principle of creation ex nihilo, I
would add an additional stipulation that God has a prime, indeed the primary, role in
creating the body of the world, even as the creatures are co-creators of the particularities
of that body. The other basis on which Peacocke demurs from the self-body metaphor is
that the self must create its ‘body’ in the divine case.48 Clearly, a great unlikeness exists
with respect to the human organism; the physiological parts of the body constitute a
necessity for the functioning of an integrated self. More widely, as we have become
aware of the pervasiveness of complex dynamic systems throughout the universe, I
would note the mutual necessity of parts and whole for the existence of a given level of
complexity. This does not apply in the divine case.
Given the just-mentioned caveats regarding the metaphor of the world as God’s
body, what justifies employment of this metaphor? What is compelling about the
likeness of the relationship between the human self and its body to the relationship
between the divine self and the body of the world? We feel many parts of our bodies
immediately and directly, and we control many aspects of our bodies immediately and
directly. The relationship between self and body is most intimate. When functioning
normally, the human organism does not perceive its phenomenal body as something
external to itself. Healthy self-love entails loving one’s own body. Thus, the elements of
likeness are the immediacy, the closeness, the intimacy of God to creation, an intimacy
that conveys the significance of the world to God, and the tremendous love God has for
the world. As the scientific evidence of the embodied nature of human rationality and
meaning continues to mount, the resonance of the world as God’s body with our own
embodied reality is just too valuable resource to reject or ignore.
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44 For example, Hartshorne,Man’s Vision of God and the Logic of Theism (New York: Harper & Row, 1941;
reprint edition, Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1964), pp. 176–185.
45 Arthur Peacocke, ‘Articulating God’s Presence,’ in In Whom We Live, p. 151.
46 Peacocke, ‘Articulating God’s Presence,’ pp. 150–151.
47 Peacocke, ‘Articulating God’s Presence,’ pp. 151–152.
48 Peacocke, ‘Articulating God’s Presence,’ p. 150.
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